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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2012, the economic activity of Hungary is expected to contract by 0.3%, before 
regaining some momentum in 2013. Unemployment is foreseen to slightly decrease to 
10.6% in 2012 and to fall further in 2013. 
In the context of the overall consolidation process and following a Council decision in 
January 2012 that Hungary had not taken effective action, the government undertook 
efforts to secure the budgetary targets for 2012 and also in 2013 when substantial one-off 
revenues are phased out. There have been first steps to broaden the remit of the Fiscal 
Council but it still does not include crucial tasks and multiannual fiscal planning remains 
indicative. Further, the Hungarian government has pursued an extensive structural reform 
agenda including key elements targeting the labour market as well as steps to reform the 
business environment. In several areas, policy responses remained rather incomplete. 
Hungary continues to face serious challenges in the short to medium term. The 
attainment of the deficit target of 2.5 % of GDP in 2012 and 2.2 % of GDP in 2013 will 
have to be ensured in a sustainable way. The already adopted cardinal law on economic 
stability does not include a binding medium-term budgetary framework. Further, the 
recent tax changes have negatively impacted low earners and have therefore not 
contributed to enhancing employment. The public employment service has been 
reorganised resulting in an overall downsizing, pointing in the opposite direction of what 
was recommended in 2011. A further challenge relates to the transparency and quality of 
public administration, where Hungary ranks low on many indicators. The equity and 
effectiveness of the school system is also of concern, especially with regard to recent 
legislative changes that risk increasing the number of early school leavers and 
segregation in the Hungarian school system. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2011 the Commission proposed five country-specific recommendations (CSRs) 
for economic and structural reform policies for Hungary. In July 2011 the Council of the 
European Union adopted these recommendations which concerned public finances, 
including fiscal governance, the labour market, and the business environment (lowering 
administrative burden and improving access to non-bank funding). In November 2011 
the Commission published its Annual Growth Survey for 2012 (AGS 2012) in which it 
set out its proposals for building the necessary common understanding about the 
priorities for action at national and EU level in 2012 and encouraged Member States to 
implement these priorities in the 2012 European semester. 
Against this background, Hungary presented updates of its National Reform Programme 
(NRP) and Convergence Programme (CP) in April 2012. These programmes give details 
on progress made since July 2011 and plans going forward. This Staff Working 
Document assesses the state of implementation of the 2011 CSRs and it identifies 
Hungary's current policy challenges in light of the AGS 2012 and the country’s latest 
policy plans. 
Overall assessment  
Hungary's progress towards meeting the 2011 Council recommendations has been mixed. 
The Council decided in January 2012 that Hungary had not taken effective action in 
response to its recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure and in March it 
issued new recommendations, following which the Hungarian authorities decided on 
further consolidation measures in April. The Fiscal Council's remit has been broadened 
but it still does not include crucial tasks (e.g. regular publication of macro-fiscal 
baselines), and multiannual fiscal planning remains indicative. The government has an 
extensive structural reform agenda with several elements targeting the labour market, and 
notable advances have been made. Nevertheless, policy responses in areas such as 
taxation, encouraging women's participation in the labour market or active labour market 
policies have been piecemeal, or otherwise problematic. Steps have also been taken to 
reform the business environment, but progress has not been uniform. 
The challenges identified in July 2011 and re-iterated in the AGS 2012 therefore remain 
valid. Fiscal consolidation is a pressing challenge for Hungary, but wider reforms also 
remain necessary to promote the conditions for sustainable, investment-led growth. 
Hungary faces ongoing challenges to raise the participation rate and the employment rate, 
to improve active labour market policies and social inclusion, particularly in education, 
to broaden access to high quality, affordable childcare, to reduce the administrative 
burden and improve the business environment, as well as improving the transparency and 
quality of public administration.  
Hungary's 2012 NRP and convergence programme contain significant measures whose 
specification (where still necessary) and implementation could facilitate the progress 
towards addressing key challenges. Nevertheless, steps could be taken to ensure that 
policymaking supports these goals more coherently and efficiently.  
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 2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 2.1. Recent economic developments and outlook  
Recent economic developments 
The Hungarian economy started 2011 amidst a number of indicators pointing towards 
accelerating real GDP growth to close to 3% supported by a slow rebalancing in the 
economy. The developments over the course of the year led to a significant revision of 
this picture given the deterioration of the external environment which played out over 
several channels (a decline in external demand, higher funding costs, hiking instalment 
payments on foreign currency denominated loans), as well as squeezed domestic demand 
and policy uncertainties. GDP growth in 2011 turned out to be at 1.7% as the main 
engine of the economy was the export sector, which will continue to drive growth over 
the forecast horizon. 
Economic outlook 
In the 2012 Spring Forecast, the Commission services project GDP to contract by 0.3% 
in 2012, and to recover to a modest growth rate of 1% in 2013. This does not incorporate 
the GDP flash estimate for the first quarter which showed a much stronger-than-expected 
contraction of 1.3%. The ongoing deleveraging in the enterprise and household sectors is 
expected to remain pronounced, with credit supply constraints remaining significant and 
biting especially for corporations. Against this background, the newly specified measures 
in Hungary's 2012 convergence programme will further depress domestic demand. In 
particular, in 2013 the financial transaction tax is the new measure that is expected to 
have the largest negative impact on the economy. It is anticipated to depress gross fixed 
capital formation as it will primarily affect companies (depending on the eventual 
legislative details it may put a further drag on bank lending), but it is also projected to 
have a substantial negative impact on private consumption expenditure. The enterprise 
sector will be further hit by the redesigned insurance and energy levies, and some of the 
measures introduced in the course of 2012, including the new telecommunications levy, 
will have an additional negative impact as they will be in force throughout 2013.  
Although Hungary's largest export markets are projected to be growing at a lower rate 
than anticipated at the time of the autumn 2011 forecast, the lower import projections 
mean that the contribution of net exports to growth will remain significant. Hungary is 
also expected to gain market share as a result of new automobile factories coming on 
line, starting in the second quarter of 2012. The current account is estimated to increase 
further over the forecast horizon. The new tax measures also imply that inflation is likely 
to remain well above the central bank's target rate over the forecast horizon.1 
Unemployment is expected to decline from this year, with Hungary's expanding public 
works scheme to provide most of the employment growth in 2012-2013. 
The authorities used the Commission's QUEST III model to estimate the impact of 
several structural measures. Some of the assumptions they used (e.g. a 50% reduction in 
administrative burden) appear to have skewed the results. In any case, the 
macroeconomic projections presented in the NRP and the convergence programme do 
not directly build on the output of their modelling exercise. The Hungarian authorities 
                                                 
1  For a more detailed analysis on the external balances and inflation trends, please see the 
Hungarian chapter of the Commission's Convergence Report released as part of the European 
Semester package. 
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share the Commission's view that the economy will be driven by net exports over the 
forecast horizon, but the government is more optimistic regarding domestic demand, 
particularly in 2013. In 2012, the projected fall in government consumption expenditure 
appears on the low side in volume terms given the consolidation measures. In nominal 
terms the difference in the GDP forecasts is smaller since the authorities' inflation 
forecast is surprisingly low given the new measures. Concerning 2013, the forecast of 
private consumption expenditure growth is on the high side, driven by more sanguine 
assumptions regarding employment growth in the private sector. Gross fixed capital 
formation is also more positive in the authorities' 2013 forecast, since they assume that 
several of the measures such as the financial transactions tax would impact technology 
rather than shorter term capital investment.  
Procedural and governance issues 
Hungary submitted both the NRP and the convergence programme on 23 April 2012. The 
documents are fairly substantial, broadly consistent and follow the agreed guidelines. 
The two documents outline in an integrated manner the fiscal consolidation efforts and 
key structural reforms as well as reforms underpinning macro-economic convergence. 
The NRP in particular includes a large number of measures that either have not yet been 
implemented or still are in a conceptual phase and are not presented in greater detail. It 
also outlines progress towards national targets for the year 2020, putting imminent 
reform priorities in a broader context. Local authorities, Social Partners as well as civil 
society were consulted on a number of programmes and important measures included in 
the NRP, but there was no consultation on the overall reform strategy. The legal status of 
the 2012 NRP is also difficult to interpret, since in contrast with 2011, the government 
did not pass a regulation in order to adopt it. 
  2.2. Challenges  
Concerns persist over Hungary's long-term potential growth. Reforms over the past few 
years appear to have born fruit so far in expanding the labour supply, which is a much 
needed step and it will be important to continue advancing on this front. Eventually, 
labour reforms will also need to be translated into gains in employment and 
competitiveness, where considerable structural challenges persist. In addition, potential 
growth is likely to have suffered from the fact that gross fixed capital formation has 
continued declining, and the investment ratio is the lowest since 1997.  
Specific labour market challenges include supporting demand for low-skilled labour on 
the open market, given that the employment rate of this group is 25.9% as against the EU 
average of 45.1%. In addition, raising the employment rate among the Roma is a 
particularly important objective, especially in certain regions: although official statistics 
do not exist, some2 estimated their employment rate in the North Hungary region at 17% 
as against 57% in the Central Hungary region in 2010. The submitted Social Inclusion 
(Roma) Strategy and other mainstream policies are not aligned properly which 
undermines the success of the strategy. In parallel with the doubling of the funds 
allocated to public works, expenditure on other active labour market policies is being 
scaled down. The recent changes to labour taxation have increased the marginal tax rate 
for low earners, while the complex system currently in place to ameliorate the impact of 
the increased tax burden on this income group might have ambiguous effects on their 
employment rate. The youth employment rate (around 18% against the EU average of 
34%) and the labour force participation of women with young children (around 49% in 
                                                 
2  Marketingcentrum (2010) Roma társadalom 
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2011 vs. the EU average of 65.5%) are also very low, and while some limited advances 
have been made in increasing childcare facility capacities, these are outstripped by 
demand.  
While there are some promising developments in vocational training, where the business 
sector has been involved in the redesign of courses, life-long learning continues to be 
lagging. Investment in human resources in the natural sciences, mathematics, engineering 
and related fields also remains particularly important for improving growth potential. The 
current proportion of the labour force with such skills is below the EU average. Special 
attention to the profile of science and mathematics in general education would be helpful 
to prepare pupils for tertiary studies in these areas, and improving the output of primary 
education would seem necessary at least to counterbalance the reduced attention to basic 
skills in vocational education. There are also concerns that the changes afoot to the 
education system may deepen socio-economic inequalities further. Neither the current 
and planned cuts to education nor the underprivileging of R&D (where expenditure in 
Hungary remains significantly below the EU average) fits with the AGS recommendation 
of smart consolidation. 
The low level of economic confidence is reflected in a range of indicators, from the 
World Bank 2012 Doing Business indicator where Hungary was ranked 122nd globally 
in the category of investor protection, to the latest Global Competitiveness indices cited 
in section 3 of this paper. Shortcomings in the stability, predictability and transparency of 
the institutional and policy framework clearly remain obstacles to be surmounted in order 
to improve investment in Hungary (see also Box 1). 
In the financial sector, credit supply constraints remain significant, and biting in the case 
of enterprises. Many of the parent companies of foreign-owned banks are under pressure 
to deleverage given the broader economic and regulatory context, but policy 
developments have aggravated the situation. In addition to the financial sector levy, the 
early repayment of foreign currency denominated mortgages at discounted rates has 
contributed to heavy losses in the banking sector and increased policy uncertainty, 
although an agreement with the Banking Association in December has somewhat 
ameliorated the situation. However, the planned introduction of the new financial 
transaction duty will put a further burden on the banking sector. The AGS priority of 
restoring normal lending to the economy therefore remains a challenge. 
Finally, Hungary's structural reform programme is expected to translate to sizeable fiscal 
consolidation from 2012. Some elements of this package are supportive of growth, and 
others have the potential to be so; for instance, the reform of the transport sector has the 
potential to achieve sizeable fiscal gains while also improving its efficiency and 
performance. Although not fully reflected in the NRP, current reform plans in the 
healthcare sector also have the potential to improve fiscal sustainability. Overall, 
however, the policy mix is regressive and is not in line with the AGS priority of 
differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation. On the whole, progress towards 
reducing the high public debt ratio is very much needed. The result of high fiscal deficits, 
especially in the 2002-2006 period, the structure and financing of public debt is also a 
source of vulnerability given that close to half of it is denominated in foreign currency 
(and close to 70% is owned by foreign residents).  
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Box 1: Summary of the results of the in-depth review under the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure 
Hungary's economy built up sizeable external and internal imbalances in the years 
leading up to 2009 and it now faces a continued adjustment challenge. The high public 
debt stock and high negative Net International Investment Position (NIIP) (81.3% and -112.5 
of GDP in 2010, respectively) are primarily the result of the continuous twin deficits  
recorded in the years before the global economic and financial crisis (fiscal adjustment was 
initiated in mid-2006, but from a very high deficit level). Over this period, Hungary's cost 
competitiveness had been deteriorating in particular vis-à-vis regional peers.  
With the deep crisis, a sharp adjustment has taken place with the country's net external 
balances, but important vulnerabilities remain. Starting from late 2008, the current 
account rebounded into a surplus as domestic demand collapsed and corrective steps were 
taken also in the context of a EUR 20 bn EU-IMF financial assistance programme. It was 
also supported by the significant improvement in cost competitiveness through mainly the 
depreciation of the forint and a decline in real wages. The Commission services' Spring 2012 
forecast points to further steep reduction in the NIIP to well below 90% of GDP by the end 
of 2013. Public debt sustainability calculations prepared by the Commission services show 
that a firm decreasing path for public debt is attainable in the coming decade, but continued 
tension in the financial markets could relatively easily reverse this trend. The resolute 
decrease in public indebtedness is all the more important as rolling over such a high gross 
debt stock always implies increased vulnerabilities. The associated risks have prompted the 
national authorities to seek a precautionary financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, on 
which negotiations are yet to start.  
At the same time, Hungary's medium-term growth outlook is modest at best, partly as a 
consequence of policy uncertainty. The potential growth is currently estimated to be 
considerably lower than what is expected for neighbouring countries: in the range of 0.2-
0.4% for the 2011-2013 period. The persisting concerns over the country's long-term 
potential growth are to a large extent due to labour market weaknesses and a historically low 
level of investments. These bottlenecks to growth are also linked to the significant decrease 
in FDI inflows starting from 2009, also linked to a fall in reinvested profits. The low level of 
economic confidence is explained first by the crisis but more recently by significant (and 
often controversial) changes in the policy environment.  
The high stock of private debt (at 155% of GDP) stands out among catching-up 
economies. Despite the recent rapid deleveraging, its currency composition (according to 
financial accounts data over 60% is denominated in foreign currency) is still a source of 
concern, which in turn contributes to the important strains on Hungary's strongly 
interconnected banking sector. The recently experienced high CDS sovereign spreads has a 
host of negative implications for economic prospects and contributed to the increasingly high 
financing costs of the real sector.  
In this context, the policy response could usefully include creating the conditions for 
sustained macroeconomic growth as well as a gradual but sustained deleveraging of 
both private and public agents. This should also make the country less vulnerable to 
changes in market sentiment and restore its attractiveness for foreign direct investment. 
Policy initiatives could therefore target the creation of a predictable policy environment and 
well-functioning institutional system, which should be conducive to the sustained reduction 
in stock vulnerabilities. In addition, structural reforms in both labour and product markets are 
worth pursuing in order to lift the country's potential growth.  
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 3. ASSESSMENT OF POLICY AGENDA  
 3.1. Fiscal policy and taxation  
Budgetary developments and debt dynamics 
The 2012 convergence programme confirms the deficit path laid down in the 2011 
update of the convergence programme, i.e. deficit targets of 2.5% of GDP in 2012 and 
2.2% of GDP in 2013. The deficit is planned to decrease further to 1.5% of GDP by 
2015. In parallel, the (recalculated) structural balance3 will improve from 4.0% of GDP 
in 2011 to 1.9% of GDP in 2012 and 1.2% of GDP in 2013 and slightly further in 2014 
and 2015. This means that the medium-term-objective (MTO) of a deficit of 1.5% of 
GDP, which is unchanged compared to the target defined in 2011 and adequately reflects 
the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, would be achieved in 2013, i.e. the 
2012 convergence programme aims to achieve the MTO two years earlier than planned in 
the 2011 convergence programme.4 This deficit path would also bring the deficit below 
the threshold of 3% of GDP by 2012 and beyond. 
In 2011, the headline general government balance reached a surplus of 4.3% as against a 
surplus of 2% of GDP targeted in the 2011 convergence programme. According to the 
Commission services calculation, the 2011 convergence programme at the time included 
a headline 2011 deficit net of one-offs of close to 6% of GDP, while  based on the 2011 
budgetary outcomes, the headline deficit net of one-offs was around 5¼% of GDP5, i.e. 
better than expected by close to ¾% of GDP. This better outcome is mainly explained by 
the small surplus of the local government sector compared to an expected deficit (0.5% 
of GDP) and some savings measures in the course of the second half of the year (around 
0.2% of GDP), such as the increase in excise duties and expenditure cuts in the budgetary 
chapters. Regarding the one-offs, on the revenue side the value of the transferred pension 
assets was higher by 0.7% of GDP than the 9% of GDP expected in the 2011 
convergence programme. The headline deficit also improved by close to 1% of GDP due 
to changes regarding one-off expenditures since the debt assumption and PPP buy-backs 
(together close to 2% of GDP) eventually did not take place6 and this was only partly 
counterbalanced by additional one-off expenditures.7 
Regarding 2012, the attainment of the official deficit target of 2.5% of GDP is supported 
by further savings measures (of around 1¾% of GDP, according to the Commission 
services calculation)  compared to the 2011 convergence programme, which are intended 
                                                 
3  Cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, recalculated by the 
Commission services on the basis of the information provided in the programme, using the 
commonly agreed methodology. 
4  It may be worth recalling that, according to the (recalculated) structural balance incorporated in 
the 2011 convergence programme, the MTO would have not been achieved in the programme 
period.  
5   The 2012 convergence programme includes a calculation suggesting that the 2011 general 
government deficit excluding one-off items within the year was only 2.43% of GDP. This figure, 
however, does incorporate an important part of the one-off revenues (i.e. the budgeted part of the 
revenues stemming from the transfer of the private pension assets and the entire amount of the 
temporary sectoral levies).  
6  The government finally took over only HUF 50 bn (close to 0.2% of GDP) of the railway 
company’s debt (MAV), which cannot be accounted for as one-off expenditure mainly since it 
was needed to cover the annual financing gap  of the MAV. 
7  These additional one-off expenditures include VAT related compensation payments in the light of 
the EU Court of Justice’s decision of July 2011, the public expenditure pertaining to the early FX 
repayment scheme and a part of the capital injection in the Hungarian Development Bank. 
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to counterbalance some expenditure slippages and revenue shortfalls, partly related to the 
worse than expected economic growth developments.8 These further savings reflect 
exclusively revenue increasing measures, such as the hike of the standard VAT rate from 
25% to 27% as well as some recently announced tax increases (e.g. a permanent levy on 
telecommunication services. The expenditure cuts (e.g. reduction of expenditures in the 
budgetary chapters, partly announced in the 2012 convergence programme) were fully 
counterbalanced by expenditure increasing decisions (e.g. outlays related to the mid-
December 2011 agreement with the banking sector as well as the extension of the public 
work programme). 
According to the Commission services' 2012 Spring Forecast, the 2012 deficit target is 
foreseen to be reached. However, this forecast includes net one-offs amounting to around 
0.9% of GDP (mainly related to the temporary sectoral levies). Without these temporary 
factors the budget deficit would be close to 3½% of GDP. This forecast assumes the 
elimination of the (full amount of) extraordinary reserve of close to 1½% of GDP, which 
was created to compensate for unforeseen developments in order to ensure that the deficit 
target can still be met.9  In contrast, the convergence programme still assumes the 
availability of an extraordinary reserve of 0.4% of GDP in 2012. This difference is on 
account of the expenditure slippages of close to ½% of GDP expected by the 
Commission services related notably for pharmaceutical subsidies and the transport 
sector. 
In 2013, according to the 2012 convergence programme, without taking additional 
measures and also in view of the phasing out of the extraordinary sectoral levies of close 
to 1% of GDP, the budget deficit would be expected to reach 3.6% of GDP, i.e. be higher 
than the deficit target by close to 1½% of GDP.10  This is in line with the deficit forecast 
underpinning the Council recommendation to Hungary of March 2012 in the context of 
the excessive deficit procedure. Against this background, the 2012 convergence 
programme lists additional revenue-increasing11 and expenditure savings measures of 
around 1.7% of GDP (for details see Box 2 below).  
Also taking into account the implementation risks partly due to the lack of sufficient 
specification mainly on the expenditure side, around two thirds of this deficit improving 
effect of 1.7% of GDP (i.e. 1.1% of GDP) could be incorporated in the Commission 
services' 2012 Spring Forecast. Whereas the 2012 convergence programme forecasts that 
the deficit target of 2.2% of GDP will be achieved while preserving an extraordinary 
reserve of at least 0.2% of GDP12, the Commission services' 2012 Spring Forecast 
projected a deficit of 2.9% of GDP without any extraordinary reserve left. This higher 
                                                 
8  Regarding 2012, the 2011 convergence programme contained saving measures of slightly more 
than 1½% of GDP, mainly related to the Szell Kalman structural reform programme (such as the 
reduction of unemployment benefit and pharmaceutical subsidies).  
9  An extraordinary reserve of 1.1% of GDP was incorporated in the 2012 budget, which was 
complemented by close to 0.4% of GDP thanks to saving measures announced in the 2012 
convergence programme.  
10  This no-policy-change scenario already incorporates of the deficit-improving effect of the further 
implementation of the Szell Kalman structural reform programme of around ½% of GDP, which, 
however, is partly offset by increasing expenditures (e.g. further extension of the public work 
programme) and revenue reducing decisions (e.g. narrowing of the tax base for  personal income 
tax).  
11  As regards the financial transaction duty, the 2012 convergence programme envisages a revenue 
of 0.4 – 0.75% of GDP. 
12  The reserve is expected to be between 0.2 and 0.5% of GDP depending on revenue raised from the 
financial transaction duty. 
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deficit forecast, beyond the implementation risks related to the saving measures, also 
reflects a worse macroeconomic outlook. 
It may be useful to note that the consolidation steps raise some questions in terms of 
quality, as they are mainly concentrated on the revenue side and may hinder economic 
growth also in the light of the deteriorating business environment due to the de facto 
replacement of temporary sectoral levies that were supposed to be phased out by 
permanent sectoral taxes largely in the same sectors. 
Following the cut-off date of the 2012 Spring Forecast new information became 
available. The government provided further details on the cuts to appropriations of the 
budgetary chapters13 as well as the decision to nominally freeze the expenditure of the 
central budgetary sub-system for the purchase of goods and services in 2013 was made 
public (with a combined budget improving impact of 0.2% of GDP). Finally, on 11 May 
the government also submitted to Parliament a tax package containing a number of 
elements that differed from the description in the 2012 convergence programme. Some of 
the parametric changes (e.g. lower-than-planned tax hike for the surcharge on energy and 
public utility companies) entail a combined revenue loss of close to 0.1% of GDP, which 
is estimated to be compensated by correspondingly higher receipts from the financial 
transaction duty. Taking into account all of this new information, the 2013 deficit is 
projected to fall to 2.7% of GDP. 
                                                 
13  New information clarified the extent to which the budgets of the various ministries and the 
appropriations are affected and indicated that the intended savings are based on the cancellation of 
selected tasks and efficiency improvements, which can ensure their sustainability. 
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 Box 2. Main budgetary measures  
 Revenue Expenditure  
 2011  
 Introduction of the flat PIT system (-1.8% of GDP) 
Full-year effect of CIT cut (-0.25% of GDP) 
De facto elimination of the earlier mandatory 
private pension pillar (one-off: +9.7% of GDP, 
permanent: +1.3% of GDP)  
Cut in appropriations for budgetary chapters (-0.8% 
of GDP) 
Debt assumption of MAV (+0.2% of GDP) 
Capital injection in the MFB (+0.1 % of GDP) 
Reimbursement of VAT based on EU Court 
decision (+0.7% of GDP) 
Outlay related to the agreement with the banks 
(+0.2% of GDP) 
 
 2012  
 Maintenance of the financial sector levy at its 
original rate (+0.3% of GDP) 
 Hike in the VAT standard rate from 25% to 27% 
(+0.5% of GDP) 
Increase in the SSC paid by employers (+0.4% of 
GDP) 
Introduction of a tax on telecom services (0.1% of 
GDP) 
Other tax increases (0.8% of GDP) 
Net effect of the reform of PIT (+0.3% of GDP) 
Nominal wage freeze in the public sector together 
with wage compensation (-0.1% of GDP) 
Reduction of unemployment benefit and sick pay (-
0.4% of GDP) 
Review of the pension system (-0.2% of GDP) 
Restructuring of public transport (-0.1% of GDP) 
Reduction in the drug subsidy (-0.3% of GDP) 
Improved efficiency of the public sector (-0.2% of 
GDP) 
Cut in the appropriations for the budgetary chapters 
(-0.8% of GDP) 
Outlay related to the agreement with the banks 
(+0.4% of GDP) 
Wage compensation in the private sector (+0.4% of 
GDP) 
Extension of the public works programme (+0.2% 
of GDP) 
Increased subsidy for the national railway company 
(+0.2% of GDP) 
 
 
 2013  
 Maintenance of the higher CIT rate  (0.3% of GDP) 
Phasing out of the extraordinary sectoral levies (-
0.9% of GDP) 
Narrowing of the tax base of PIT (-0.3% of GDP) 
Introduction of a financial transaction duty (at least 
0.4% of GDP) 
Higher tax rates on insurance services and the 
energy sector (0.2% of GDP) 
Full yearly impact of the tax on the telecom sector 
and the reverse charge VAT in agriculture 
(0.1% of GDP) 
Introduction of the electronic road toll (0.25% of 
Outlay related to the agreement with the banks 
(+0.2% of GDP) 
Further savings in the pension system (-0.1% of 
GDP) 
Further cut in the drug subsidy (-0.3% of GDP) 
Increased efficiency of the public sector (-0.3% of 
GDP) 
Further extension of the public work programme 
(+0.1% of GDP) 
Lower wage compensation in the private sector (-
0.1% of GDP) 
Increased salaries in the public education sector 
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GDP) (0.1% of GDP) 
Cut in the support for the state-owned enterprises (-
0.1% of GDP) 
Lower support for the Research &Development 
fund (-0.1% of GDP) 
Freezing of expenditure on the purchase of goods 
and services in the public sector (-0.2% of 
GDP) 
 2014  
 Full year effect of the electronic road toll (0.25% of 
GDP) 
Outlay related to the agreement with the banks 
(+0.2% of GDP) 
Increased salaries in the public education sector 
(0.4% of GDP) 
 
Note: The budgetary impact in the table is the impact reported in the programme, i.e. by the national authorities. 
A positive sign means that revenue/expenditure increases/decreases as a consequence of the measure. The 
degree of detail reflects the type of information made available in the convergence programme. 
 
The (recalculated) structural balance is foreseen to improve by 2.1% of GDP in 2012, 
following a deterioration of 1.4% of GDP in 2010 and 0.3% of GDP in 2011. In 2013, 
the (recalculated) structural balance improves by 0.7% of GDP, which would 
demonstrate adequate progress towards the MTO. Furthermore, the medium-term-
objective (MTO) of 1.5% of GDP, which is unchanged compared to the target defined in 
2011, would be achieved in 2013. This also means that, according the (recalculated) 
structural balance, the MTO, in contrast with the 2011 convergence programme, would 
be achieved in the course of the programme period, mainly in view of the outlook for 
lower economic growth while the deficit targets are kept. However, according to the 
Commission services assessment, the structural balance will improve only by 0.3% of 
GDP to 1.8% of GDP. This means that progress towards the MTO does not appear to be 
adequate in 2013 based on the assessment of the Commission, which takes into account 
the implementation risks associated with selected savings measures and a less optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario. 
The expenditure benchmark, according to the programme, will be met in 2013. However, 
real public expenditure growth will exceed the reference value in 2014 and in 2015 in the 
light of the assumption that economic growth will exceed the medium-term potential 
growth estimated by the Commission services based on the agreed method. 
The baseline scenario incorporated in the 2012 spring forecast is subject to symmetric 
risks. Risks pointing towards a higher deficit (e.g. higher subsidies for student and 
housing loans, potential reimbursement of losses of the central bank as well as risks 
related to the accumulated debts of public enterprises and the many expenditure cuts 
targeting the same budgetary chapters) may be off-set by deficit decreasing risks, such as 
more favourable than currently assumed balances of local governments and potentially 
increasing risk appetite, reducing interest expenditure.  
According to government plans, the public debt will be continuously reduced throughout 
the programme period to 77% of GDP in 2013 and below 73% of GDP in 2015, but will 
remain above the 60% of GDP reference value. Regarding the debt reduction benchmark, 
Hungary will be in transition period in 2013 and 2014, and plans would ensure sufficient 
progress towards compliance with the debt criterion. Moreover, according to the plans, 
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the debt benchmark will be met at the end of the transition period, in 2015. At the same 
time, according to the Commission services' assessment and assuming that no public 
assets will be sold in 2012, the debt ratio will decrease less dynamically, only to 78% of 
GDP by 2013. 
Long-term sustainability  
The projected long-term change in age-related expenditure is below the EU average. The 
initial relatively favourable budgetary position offsets the increase in long-term costs. 
Based on simulations prepared by the Commission services, under a no-policy-change 
assumption, debt would fall to 74.8% of GDP by 2020. Additional fiscal consolidation 
beyond the forecast horizon would be needed to make progress towards the reference 
value for government debt beyond the short term. However, the full implementation of 
the programme would be enough to put debt on a steeper downward path by 2020, even 
if it would still be above the 60% of GDP reference value in 2020. Ensuring sufficient 
primary surpluses over the medium-term would improve the sustainability of public 
finances. 
Fiscal framework 
After some initial signs of success with the previous budgetary framework, it was 
fundamentally revamped by the current government, which has weakened some aspects 
of the efficiency of its operation while strengthening others. The new Basic Law that 
came into effect on 1 January 2012 prohibits the adoption of a budget that would lead to 
public debt exceeding 50% of GDP. Until the debt ratio falls below this level, only 
budgets inducing a reduction in the debt ratio may be adopted. The competence of the 
Constitutional Court in legislation with budgetary implications remains restricted until 
the debt ceiling has been met. Rules for convergence to the debt ceiling and operational 
rules concerning the Fiscal Council were specified in the Economic Stability Law 
adopted in December 2011.14 Finally, the new Public Finance Act includes important (to 
a large extent re-confirmed) provisions for budgetary planning with both an annual and a 
medium-term planning horizon.  
Overall, the new Basic Law of Hungary and the legislative documents discussed above 
lay out a fiscal governance framework for Hungary that has a number of merits. 
The new set-up makes it virtually impossible to adopt a non-compliant budget act in 
economically good times; the semi-annual review offers the possibility of correcting ex-
post increases in public debt beyond the admissible level and a fiscal council occupies a 
key position in the process of budgetary planning. The accumulation of debt at local 
government level is now subject to central control. With the respective provisions in the 
Public Finance Act, the rudiments of a medium-term budgetary planning framework have 
been established. 
Nevertheless, a number of flaws remain in the new institutional framework, notably 
regarding the design features of the debt reduction rule. First, although the rule is anti-
cyclical, there is no immediate relation to the output gap, so it may or may not result in 
an outcome that is consistent with a structural budget balance constraint. Second, the 
legislation does not give guidance on the extent of admissible deviations from the debt 
constraint in the event of a significant economic recession (escape clause). Third, 
                                                 
14    The Economic Stability Law also stipulates that the income tax system is proportionate and the family 
tax allowances cannot decrease. These unusual provisions, which require a2/3 majority in 
Parliament to be amended, significantly limit the ability of the current or any future governments 
to change the tax system and adapt it to budgetary requirements. 
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although an instant interim review is foreseen if debt reduction has exceeded the 
established limit and mandates budgetary correction, no deadline is established for such a 
review. Finally, the debt reduction rule might not ensure compliance with Hungary's 
obligations regarding the speed of debt reduction (also due to the difference in debt 
definitions) and adherence to the medium-term objective. 
Regarding effective budgetary planning the government is explicitly granted the 
possibility to adjust the key figures in the outer three years of planning the central budget 
at any time without further specifics, and without any indication that these plans would 
provide the basis for the preparation of the annual budget. Therefore the multi-annual 
character of the fiscal rules is not yet guaranteed. With regard to the transparency of the 
budgetary process, the rights to access information are not specified, the timeliness of 
data publication is not stipulated and the dimension of public awareness on budgetary 
matters is not appropriately considered.  
As far as the FC is concerned, its analytical remit and material resources as stipulated 
in the ESL are not commensurate with its power to veto the annual budget law. As 
suggested by international best practice, the quality and credibility of budgetary planning 
would be increased by entrusting the FC with the preparation of the macroeconomic 
forecast underlying the draft budget and medium-term planning as well as with ex-ante 
impact assessment of major fiscal policy initiatives (e.g. tax laws, also which are outside 
the standard budgetary cycle). Even after March 2012, when the President of the FC 
became entitled to a competitive remuneration and a small secretariat was set up, the 
assignment of an appropriately sized and dedicated analytical staff is warranted.   
Against this background, the recommendations issued in July 2011 have been partly 
implemented. New regulations have been adopted for the operationalisation of the new 
constitutional fiscal governance framework but some weaknesses in its design can be 
identified. The adopted new annual numerical rule appears to focus too much on the 
annual budgetary cycle and does not seem to be conducive to medium-term budgetary 
planning, which remains indicative in the new framework. Regarding the analytical remit 
and the resources of the Fiscal Council, they are not commensurate with its newly 
granted strong veto power. There is still a need to improve the availability of budgetary 
information, also given that raising public awareness of budgetary policies could 
contribute to the success of fiscal consolidation built on fiscal consensus as well as to 
meeting the transparency requirements laid down in the Directive on national fiscal 
frameworks. 
Tax system 
The tax burden in Hungary temporarily fell by 1.5 pp. to 36% of GDP in 2011, but it is 
expected to increase to about 38.5% of GDP in 2012. This is close to the 2011 EU27 
average of 39.2% but it is higher than in comparable countries (e.g. SK (29.2%), EE 
(33.3%), CZ (35%)). In terms of the taxes considered least distortive to growth, the share 
of consumption taxes was already rather high in 2011 and is expected to increase further, 
while revenue from recurrent property taxes remains below average.  
Corporate income tax revenues fell as a result of a 2010 cut in the corporate income tax 
rate from 19% to 10% on income below a certain threshold. Personal income tax 
revenues also decreased due to the replacement of a progressive system with a 16% flat 
rate system introduced in 2011. Furthermore, in 2011 a new, generous and non-targeted 
family tax credit system was introduced with significant allowances especially for those 
with three or more children. This was partly financed from the 20% reduction in the 
employment tax credit available to low to medium earners. 
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In the decade to 2010, Hungary was characterised by high labour taxation, which 
specifically affected low wage earners (Hungary had the 4th highest tax wedge in the EU 
for single earners at 67% of the average wage in 2010). Although due to the recent 
reform the implicit tax rate on labour fell from 39.4 % in 2010 to around 35% in 2011, 
the tax burden on labour remains high in Hungary. In 2012 the PIT base for low to 
medium earners was narrowed, while at the same time the employment tax credit was 
fully removed, leading to a further overall increase in the tax burden on low earners. 
Thus the tax burden on a single average-wage worker, for example, increased by 2.4 pps. 
It is also worth noting that the social security contributions paid by employees were 
increased by 1 pp. The increase in the tax wedge has reduced the incentives to participate 
in the formal labour market for a significant proportion of the labour force, in particular 
for low-skilled and secondary workers. In comparison, the favourable labour market 
impact among high-income workers is expected to be limited due to their already high 
labour supply.  
In the private sector, a wage subsidy scheme providing a tax allowance for employers 
who maintain net nominal wages has been introduced to counterbalance the unintended 
adverse labour market effects (see also section 3.3). For public workers the government 
provide an automatic offset. The budgetary effect of these counterbalancing measures is 
officially expected to be around 0.6% of GDP. Moreover, the introduction of the flat tax 
has increased the tax burden for those who have a higher propensity to consume and thus 
may also deteriorate the short-term growth and fiscal dynamics. The maintenance beyond 
2012 of the wider PIT base for those on higher wages could generate some savings 
compared to the current plans, which may allow some compensation for lower earners in 
a budget neutral way. It is worth mentioning that this tax allowance system make the tax 
system even more complex, contrary to the original aim of the flat PIT. 
A number of new consumption-type taxes, such as a tax on unhealthy food and car 
insurance have recently been introduced, and several tax rates and duties have been 
increased. The standard VAT rate has been raised from 25% to 27% (the highest in the 
EU). The temporary extraordinary levies introduced in 2010 on the retail, 
telecommunication and energy sectors are planned to be phased out, while the financial 
levy is to be halved in 2013. However, the introduction of a number of new permanent 
taxes was announced in the 2012 convergence programme, affecting practically the same 
sectors, such as the financial transaction levy (0.45% of GDP), the tax on the 
telecommunication services (0.15% of GDP) as well as increased surcharges on 
insurance services and the energy sector (0.2% of GDP). Since the recent tax reforms 
have resulted in a falling share of income taxes while consumption taxes have further 
increased, the main issues at present are not the scope for further tax shifts to enhance 
growth, but rather the unwanted behavioural impacts of the recent reforms, which may 
undermine growth prospects, including the detrimental impact on the investment climate 
of the extraordinary levies and their replacement by permanent levies from 2013. 
Revenue from recurrent property taxation in Hungary accounted for only 0.35% of GDP 
in 2009, while approaching the EU average (for the 19 Member States for which data are 
available) could provide additional revenue of about 0.5% of GDP. Potential measures 
along these lines could be designed to mitigate the negative impact on vulnerable 
households.  
The horizontal screening of tax challenges points to concerns with tax governance. The 
Hungarian tax system is characterised by significant tax evasion as indicated by the large 
shadow economy and signs of undeclared work. The size of the shadow economy is 
estimated at nearly 24%, i.e. substantially above the EU average of 16%.  Underreporting 
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is common as many Hungarians declare an income at the minimum wage, although the 
prevalence of such underreporting is likely to be lower than sometimes claimed 
(overstating the revenue impact but understating the employment impact of a minimum 
wage hike)15. The self-employed have also been found to practice underreporting. The 
government has recently taken measures that go in the right direction, i.e. allowing 
unannounced audits and increasing penalties. 
  
 3.2. Financial sector  
The financial indicators for the Hungarian banking sector remain solid, although the 
aggregate figures mask significant divergences among banks. No Hungarian financial 
institution was identified as needing recapitalisation in the context of the temporary bank 
recapitalisation exercise launched by the European Council of October 2011 and 
coordinated by the European Banking Authority, but the non-performing loan (NPL) 
ratio reached 13.5% and the share of corporate NPLs is among the highest in the EU. The 
banking sector has been weakened by the lacklustre economic performance, its 
exposure to foreign currency loans and unfavourable policy measures. Several large 
banks are owned by foreign parent companies that are themselves under pressure to meet 
regulatory and market capital requirements. Credit to the economy has been 
contracting, in contrast with most regional peers. Credit conditions have been 
particularly tight in the enterprise sector, with the decline in corporate lending having 
reached a four-year record in December 2011. Venture capital investments fell by more 
than 10% in 2011, the highest negative rate in the EU27.  
The 2011 Country-Specific Recommendations to Hungary called for assessing the effectiveness of current SME 
support policies and adjusting public programmes to improve access to non-bank funding. In line with this 
recommendation, Hungary reformed its JEREMIE programme in order to increase both 
absorption and the leverage effect. In this context, combined microcredit tenders have 
been introduced from spring 2011, providing non-refundable grants combined with credit 
to micro enterprises. New calls are also available in the area of seed/venture capital: 
investments financed from venture capital more than tripled in 2011. By the end of 2011 
more than EUR 200 million reached final beneficiaries under the JEREMIE programme 
(mainly public money), and implementation has been accelerated through innovative 
instruments. Guarantees in particular have had a notable multiplying effect. 
Hungary also increased the allocation of resources to business development in the 
framework of the New Széchenyi Plan (NSzP). The Széchenyi Card Programme, 
modified in 2011, provides credit-card based, low-interest loans for micro-, small- and 
medium enterprises at Hungarian credit institutions. Interest and guarantee fee subsidies 
are also offered. So far more than 150 000 cards have been issued with a credit line of 
about EUR 3.5 billion, and in 2011 the contracted amounts increased by more than 8% in 
nominal terms. There remains a concern that young innovative enterprises and start-up 
companies do not meet the criteria required in the calls for non-refundable subsidies, 
although there are some legitimate considerations behind this. For example, NSzP calls 
require applicants to have been in business for at least two years, aiming to exclude 
companies that set up just to apply for funding and then declare bankruptcy. However, 
start-up SMEs can also benefit from the new combined micro-credit tenders and low-
interest loans.   
                                                 
15 See e.g. Elek et al (2009) A bérekhez kapcsolódó adóeltitkolás Magyarországon 
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The implementation of the 2011 recommendation on SME policies has therefore 
been mixed. The measures to improve access to non-bank funding have been relevant 
and relatively ambitious compared to the practice in the past. However, the effectiveness 
of current SME policies has not been reviewed, although the NRP refers to revising the 
SME support system at the end of 2010. Hungary has also not introduced any monitoring 
system for assessing the impact of SME policies. 
The measures described above in themselves support the AGS priority for improving 
SME access to finance. However, the overall package of government policies has not 
been conducive to the ultimate aim of restoring normal lending to the economy. The 
financial sector levy approved by Hungarian lawmakers back in 2010, of which 0.45% of 
GDP falls on banks, is the largest in the EU (planned to be cut from 2013). Further, the 
government unilaterally opened the possibility of early repayment of FX-denominated 
mortgages at discounted rates in September 2011, which resulted in losses for the 
banking sector in the order of 1¼% of GDP, and principally benefited a relatively small 
group of rather well-off Hungarians whose mortgages were not in arrears. The 
government reached an agreement with the Banking Association in December also to 
reduce the losses of the banking sector on these loans, although these still remained 
substantial (1/3 of these losses can be deducted from the bank levy, resulting in a net loss 
from this scheme of below 1% of GDP). Going forward, a stable policy environment will 
be crucial in order to support the resumption of lending activity. Broadening the range of 
eligible issuers of domestic mortgage-covered bonds could also contribute to a more 
stable funding structure and may promote lower interest rates for borrowers. 
 3.3. Labour market, education and social policy 
The participation rate in Hungary has been increasing over the past years due to policy 
measures introduced by the current and the previous government, but it still remains 
among the lowest in the EU (HU: 62.7%, EU 71.2% in 2011). Unemployment has been 
in the double digits (10.9% in 2011) and is projected to remain so over the forecast 
horizon. As outlined in section 2.2, the employment rate of the Roma, of the low-skilled 
and of the young is particularly low and social inclusion is lagging.  Women's share of 
the total volume of hours worked is the 6th highest in the EU, but their participation in the 
labour market is still hampered by the fact that available childcare capacity falls well 
short of the actual and potential demand: in 2010, the capacity utilisation of crèches was 
110%, and coverage is particularly scant outside of large cities. Maternity leave, at up to 
3 years, is uniquely long. 
The geographical and occupational mobility of the labour force is poor. The contributing 
factors include a high proportion of house ownership, regional differences in rental prices 
and the lack of an efficient and deep residential rental market, and a low participation 
rate in life-long learning. In addition, according to the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce, the proportion of vocationally trained workers who are either unemployed or 
working in fields that do not correspond to their professional qualifications is around 
60%, suggesting a mismatch between labour market requirements and the skills acquired 
in the educational system. State contributions and grants for school education have been 
cut, although already in 2010 the total amount was only 80% of the 2006 figure. 
Hungary's global ranking on the training of education staff, at 111th place, is extremely 
low16.  
                                                 
16 World Economic Forum (2011-12) Global Competitiveness Report 
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As reflected in the NRP, the government has introduced numerous reforms in the labour 
market over the past year. These include tax changes, a drastic cut in the unemployment 
benefit to 90 days that came into effect in September 2011 and tightening other benefits, 
a new labour code (which is being scrutinised by the Commission and which especially 
initially proved to be an unfavourable example of downplaying social dialogue), and 
piloting vocational training under the new system devised in consultation with the 
Chamber of Commerce. At the end of 2011 new laws were also adopted on public, 
vocational and higher education. The pensionable age has been raised by three years and 
early retirement abolished (without adequate labour demand and complementary 
retirement savings, the future adequacy of the pension system and therefore the possible 
hidden liabilities for the public budget may require attention). However, progress 
towards meeting the country-specific recommendations has been limited and the 
recommendations have only been implemented in part.  
With respect to the 2011 recommendation on activation policies, the participation rate 
has indeed been rising (from 62% (2009 Q4) to above 63% (2011 Q4) in the 15-64 age 
group) in parallel with the drastic tightening of social assistance schemes and the 
unemployment benefit. At the same time, the measures to alleviate the impact of the tax 
reform on low earners have been far from ideal. The full elimination of the employment 
tax credit in 2012, combined with an increase in social security contributions, has further 
aggravated the situation of low earners: those without children who take home less than 
the average wage can ceteris paribus be facing an over 10% drop in their wages 
compared to 2011.  
To ameliorate these developments, the government raised the minimum wage by around 
19% and introduced employer wage subsidy schemes. However, this convoluted system, 
whose elements are set out in the NRP, does not necessarily offer relief to low earners 
other than at the minimum wage, and it renders the marginal tax rate the highest at low 
incomes. The minimum wage raise is also likely to be unfavourable for labour demand 
and it may increase grey employment, inflationary pressures and expectations of a 
weakening exchange rate. (On the upside, the legislation introduced the possibility to 
differentiate the minimum wage by region.) The wage subsidy schemes, which in any 
case may be temporary, do not offset all of the resulting burden on companies and 
employees, even leaving aside the administrative costs and the additional costs that may 
be involved if approximate wage ratios between different wage levels are maintained. 
Moreover, this scheme, as long as it is in effect, deteriorates the budgetary balance  
The NRP describes steps that have been taken to encourage women's participation in 
the labour market: e.g. the new labour code encourages flexible working arrangements, 
as well as easing the conditions of return of new parents to the labour market. Progress 
on expanding childcare has been meagre, mainly due to the lack of funding (it is relevant 
to know here that the child tax allowances and the child benefits are not means-tested). 
The pressures on the system, especially in regions characterised by more favourable 
demographic trends, will only increase since the mandatory age for kindergarten 
participation was lowered from five years to three (taking effect in 2014). Support for 
alternative childcare services from EU sources (ESF) has been increased from HUF 6 bn 
to HUF 8 bn, but the overall amounts are small, while the sustainability of institutions 
established mainly from EU (ERDF) funding is challenging given that the responsibility 
for operational costs remains with local governments. 
The policy responses to the 2011 recommendation on activation policies therefore have 
only been partially relevant to the extent that the instruments chosen to address the 
impact of the tax reform on low earners have been suboptimal, while the measures to 
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strengthen women's participation in the labour market are a very small step in the right 
direction and they are too limited to have a significant impact. The policy instruments 
cannot be considered ambitious since their scope is rather limited in comparison to the 
challenge. . 
Regarding the 2011 recommendation on active labour market policies, the Public 
Employment Service has been reorganised again as of January 2012, including a merger 
with the Office for Labour Supervision and the National Institute for Vocational 
Education. This has brought with it a downsizing in the Public Employment Service, 
whose capacity has already been under pressure given high unemployment since the 
crisis. In parallel, a National Rehabilitation Authority is being set up to become 
operational in July 2012, with the staff to be drawn from the local Public Employment 
Service offices. Furthermore, half of the institution's overall capacity is now committed 
to managing the new public work scheme. Rather than strengthening the capacity of the 
Public Employment Service, therefore, developments are pointing in the opposite 
direction.  
Active labour market policies are also undergoing large-scale restructuring, with cuts in 
training expenditure but doubling the funds allocated to public works compared to 2011. 
However, there is no comprehensive evidence-based evaluation of running active labour 
market policies that would back these changes. Insofar as training programmes may have 
been relatively ineffective, it would have been preferable to improve the provision of 
training instead of cutting down on it. It would also be desirable to facilitate mobility 
support (as also encouraged by the Commission's Employment Package). The public 
works scheme serves the double purpose of targeting social inclusion and activation, but 
the latter element should be strengthened in order to increase the chances of finding 
employment in the open labour market. Conducting job search is difficult for participants 
when most employment in the public works scheme is full time (as of this year), without 
making allowances for this within the structure of the public works scheme. There is a 
risk that the drastic cut in unemployment benefit, together with the reduced capacities of 
the Public Employment Service, will result in channelling and locking people in to public 
works. 
A new European Social Fund active labour market programme for integrating 
disadvantaged groups has been launched, with some modifications relative to the 
previous such programme. In regions with a high proportion of low skilled inhabitants 
and long-term unemployed, more focus will be given to training, counselling and job 
search assistance. The indicators set for this four-year programme are evidence based and 
there is close monitoring. The Social Renewal Operational programme is also being 
modified to increase the allocation to active labour market policies and life-long learning, 
general foreign language and IT training and on-the-job training programmes. A new 
programme is being set up to help disadvantaged people develop life management skills. 
In sum, there has been no progress towards meeting the recommendation regarding the 
Public Employment Service. Some of the measures aiming to provide tailor-made 
services for disadvantaged groups are relevant (the European Social Fund programmes), 
others are ambitious insofar as the activation of some disadvantaged groups is concerned, 
but unlikely to be effective in improving the placement of participants in the open job 
market (public works). In the absence of a comprehensive evaluation of active labour 
market policies provision, there has not been much progress in linking funding to results.  
In terms of AGS priorities, Hungary has embarked on important advances in supporting 
employment, including of young people. The government’s youth policy framework 
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programme (New Generation Programme) was approved at the end of 2011, with an 
emphatic element on improving youth employment. Vocational education and training is 
being revised to better respond to skills demand in the labour market, and rigidities of 
contracts have been reduced. It should nevertheless be noted that the reduced attention to 
elementary, general skills in vocational education could become a concern without 
significant and coordinated efforts in parallel to improve the output of primary education 
given the current poor state of affairs and the fact that employers seek adaptability.17 The 
Dobbantó pilot project helping pupils in need to catch up appears to be successful. 
Mainstreaming its features into the Bridge Programme framework would be promising 
from an educational point of view, but this cannot happen without appropriate funding 
and the NRP does not foresee additional resources for this purpose. 
Funding for tertiary education has been cut given the need for fiscal consolidation. 
Science and mathematics placements have been privileged within this context, but raising 
the overall tertiary attainment rate should remain a priority since, at 25.7%  
in 2010, it is well below the EU average and the NRP target. As students from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds tend to be more averse to taking on financial risks, it would 
be important to monitor their participation in the student loan scheme. In addition, 
elements of the new legislation on school education risk increasing the number of early 
school leavers and further segregation in the Hungarian school system, while the low 
participation rate in lifelong learning hampers competitiveness and labour market 
adaptation. Progress has been mixed in mobilising labour for growth. The activity rate 
has been increasing, but several sectors with the highest employment potential (‘white 
jobs’ in the health and social sectors) are chronically underfunded and a forward looking 
health workforce strategy would also be important to retain healthcare professionals to 
meet the growing demands of healthcare. There is also room to improve the promotion of 
entrepreneurial skills.  
Finally, Hungary recent policy record in protecting the vulnerable is in sharp contrast to 
the AGS recommendations. The effectiveness of social protection systems decreased, 
while the share of the population at risk of poverty or exclusion increased from 28.2 in 
2008 to 29.9% in 2010, and the proportion of those affected by material deprivation from 
17.9 in 2008 to 21.6% in 2010.18 In the absence of the EU-IMF balance of payments 
assistance, the crisis would likely have been much worse and these indicators could have 
risen yet further. In the context also of the fact that Hungary's child poverty rate is about 
1.5 times the EU average, the higher emphasis on early childhood development in the 
Social Inclusion Strategy (submitted on 6 December 2011) is welcomed but, together 
with other important elements in the text, it is not reflected appropriately in the 
accompanying action plan and in mainstream policies19. As a bright spot, investments are 
in the pipeline from EU funds in developing social infrastructure and integrated action in 
favour of marginalised communities (e.g. the Roma). However, a monitoring system is 
yet to be launched.  
 
                                                 
17 See e.g. János Köllő (2011) Kudarcismétlő szakoktatás 
18  The 2012 FRA/UNDP/WB report ‘The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States’ states that the 
percentage of households at risk of poverty is much higher – more than double – for marginalised 
Roma households than for marginalised non-Roma households. 
19  Discrepancies can be observed in the fields of education, employment and the accessibility of 
social services. In addition, the foreseen transfer of schools with a Roma majority to Roma self-
governments increases the risk of school segregation. 
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 3.4. Structural measures promoting growth and competitiveness  
Hungary's ranking in the Global Competitiveness Index has advanced from 58th position 
in 2009-10 to 48th in 2011-12, but there remains considerable scope to improve. Cost 
competitiveness had been considerably declining before the crisis, but then improved on 
the back on the depreciation of the forint and a decline in real wages. Albeit Hungary 
continuously gained market share before 2009, its performance lagged behind regional 
peers. The relative resilience of the export sector to declining cost competitiveness may 
be linked to the very significant share of high-technology goods (at over 22% of total 
exports, one of the highest in the EU-27).  
Research and innovation  
As the NRP also notes, R&D expenditure in Hungary (1.16% in 2010) is significantly 
below the EU average. Unhelpfully from the point of view of incentivising R&D in the 
private sector, the direct costs of research and development can no longer be deducted 
from the innovation tax payable by enterprises. Coordination between the authorities 
responsible for different tasks does not appear effective, as reflected for instance in the 
significant delay in the preparation of the new R&D&I strategy, and predictability in 
funding rules has not yet been achieved. On the positive side, several schemes, 
discontinued after June 2010 and co-financed from the EU Structural Funds, were 
reopened in 2011. According to the NRP, Hungary is preparing to position itself for fully 
maximising EU funds and programmes in the next funding period. 
Hungary ranks as a moderate innovator in the Innovation Union Scoreboard with a 
performance below EU average, with business R&D investment driven primarily by 
foreign-owned enterprises. In terms of indicators of SME innovation (introducing a new 
product or a new process), Hungary ranks among the lowest in the EU together with 
Latvia. In patent statistics, Hungary is ranked 16th among the Member States with 1.3 
PCT patent applications per billion GDP (compared to the EU average of 4), and the 
trend is slightly decreasing. Human resources for research are currently projected to be 
insufficient by 2015, although the number of students in maths, science and technology 
supported from public sources will increase significantly according to the new tertiary 
education act. Researcher mobility has long been low both in terms of inter-sectoral and 
cross-border mobility. In 2010, foreign researchers employed in Hungary accounted for 
only 3% of the total number of researchers.  
Internal market, liberalisation and competition 
Several postal services remain significantly shielded from competition, particularly in 
the letter mail segment, despite gradual market opening introduced by the Postal Services 
Directives and implemented by the Postal Act in Hungary. Excessively restrictive 
licensing requirements introduced into the national regulatory framework are widely 
perceived to be the main reason behind the lack of actual entry into the letter mail 
delivery service, and limited entry into related market segments despite interest by 
various market actors. Furthermore, the effect of the recent amendment of the 2003 
Postal Act will be a de facto re-monopolisation of integrated mail, which is an added 
value service that is currently provided freely on the market. This is a significant step 
backward as the measure carries a strong negative signal value for further potential 
entrants in other segments as well.  
Competition is lagging in the professional services. Among the 21 Member States 
included in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development regulatory 
index on professional services, Hungary is the fourth worst ranked. Despite the 
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judgments of the CJEU of 24.5.2011 (concerning 8 other Member States), Hungary 
refused to repeal the nationality requirement for the profession of notary. In the retail 
sector, Hungary now prohibits the establishment of new large scale retail stores and has 
imposed excessive licensing requirements for issuing hot meal vouchers (de facto 
restricting the market to nation-wide banks), while a state monopoly has been imposed 
on issuing cold meal vouchers.  
Infrastructure and public investment 
Structural and Cohesion Funds co-finance a substantial part of the investments included 
in the New Széchenyi Plan (adopted in January 2011). The planned aggregate public 
investment to be co-financed in the 2007-2013 period amounts to EUR 29.7 billion. The 
implementation and delivery system of the Economic Development Operational 
Programme as well as the planning and monitoring system can be considered effective, 
although highly centralised within one single National Development Agency. Following 
a successful reorganisation, implementation appears to be back on track. In 2011 an 
ambitious initiative was carried out to streamline the delivery system, particularly with 
regard to aid to enterprises: applications can now be submitted more easily and quickly, 
which contributes to the acceleration of implementation. At the same time however, 
improvements are needed in the public procurement system, where real competition 
needs to be ensured. 
On 22 March 2012, the European Commission referred Hungary to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union over the extraordinary levy on the telecom sector. Increasing the 
financial burden of telecoms operators, as indicated in the 2012 Convergence 
Programme, is likely to impede investment in a sector expected to drive growth under the 
Digital Agenda. The digital switchover is currently expected only at the end of 2014 
instead of 2012, although making spectrum available for wireless broadband could help 
reduce the digital divide, introduce more choice in broadband, and enable innovation in 
other sectors. 
Regarding transport, the liberalisation of the rail freight sector has not advanced fast 
enough and the market share of the incumbent remains above 80%. Travel times with the 
Hungarian Railways have been gradually increasing because of the growing number of 
speed limits due to the state of the tracks, which is the result of a long period of 
underspending on maintenance. Almost ¾ of the railway company’s rolling stock is out 
of date, and the technical assets of the Budapest Transport Company have reached the 
limits of their utility: 85.2% of them have been used beyond their planned lifetime.20 The 
NRP contains plans to renew the outdated vehicle park and establish an electronic 
ticketing system with the use of EU funds.  
There has been limited progress towards at increasing the efficiency of public transport 
and reducing its dependence of public funding, although the convergence programme 
rehearses previous goals and outlines some measures. The lack of progress in 
restructuring public transport has been an important reason for budget slippages in recent 
years.21 According to the convergence programme, an electronic road toll system is now 
planned to be introduced by July 2013. A recent positive development has been the 
introduction of competitive tendering for bus services in Budapest. As regards inland 
                                                 
20  Report of the State Audit Office of Hungary on the Budapest Transport Company, January 2012 
(http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/1202/jelentes-a-budapesti-kozlekedesi-zrt-gazdalkodasanak-
ellenorzeserol/1202j000.pdf) 
21  E.g. only about ¾ of railway passengers need to buy a ticket at all 
(http://www.mav.hu/res/MAV_CSR_jelentes_2009.pdf)  
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waterways, over 30 bottlenecks hamper traffic on the Danube, with an impact on the 
whole Danube transport corridor. The reallocation of funds previously earmarked for 
improving inland waterways, as indicated in the 2012 NRP, would compromise the 
navigability of the Danube. 
Energy and the environment 
Environmental protection was not mentioned in the NRP, but the potential of improving 
waste management could be explored both from a growth enhancing and an 
environmental point of view. Full implementation of the existing legislation could create 
more than 13 000 jobs and increase the annual turnover of the waste sector by nearly 
€1.400 million.22 Hungary is on track to overachieve its CO2 emission reduction target 
by 36.2% compared to the base year. Nonetheless, Hungary is not exploiting the growth 
potential that moving towards a low-carbon economy could unlock, as energy intensity 
remains high by EU standards and the NRP pays relatively little attention to R&D. 
Following through on the ambitious energy sector plans reflected in the National Energy 
Strategy (October 2011) would help limit energy dependence for growth, particularly in 
industry and from transport. It would be beneficial develop a long-term roadmap and a 
consistent monitoring mechanism in order to make sure that progress is achieved as 
planned. 
The independence of the energy regulator is not ensured and it is not yet equipped with 
adequate means to independently set network tariffs and to fulfil its tasks and 
responsibilities as defined in the Third Energy Package. Subsidies are not currently 
targeted to vulnerable consumers, which translates to an environmentally harmful 
subsidy to energy consumers. Moreover, the current cross-border capacities in gas and 
electricity are not sufficient to ensure the integration of national markets on a regional 
level, which would boost competition and improve the resilience of the energy sector to 
external supply shocks. Hungary will require investment into its energy infrastructure but 
the current regulatory environment discourages private companies from making 
investments, which may in the future put additional pressure on public finances. 
 3.5. Modernisation of public administration  
Institutional aspects rank high among the most problematic factors for doing business in 
Hungary, and are the single worst performing indicator in the Global Competitiveness 
Index. Corruption is the fourth most important concern among respondents to the 
Competitiveness Survey, and the burden of government regulation places Hungary 135th 
out of 142 countries surveyed.23 As indicated in the NRP, the most recent estimate for the 
overall administrative burden on firms is over 10% of GDP. Still, progress over the past 
decade has been remarkable in some specific areas: starting business costs dropped from 
over 100% of income per capita in 2002 to under 10% in 2011.  
As set out in the NRP, the Simple State Programme (launched in the second half of 2011) 
aims at reducing the administrative burden significantly, targeting savings of 1.7% of 
GDP in 2012 alone. Implementation is at risk of delay as responsibilities have not been 
clearly defined and the evaluation of the first set of measures has not been delivered 
                                                 
22  Based on European Commission DG ENV (2011) Implementing EU Waste Legislation for Green 
Growth. 
23  World Economic Forum (2011-12) Global Competitiveness Report. 
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yet.24 Some elements of e-government such as the single document management are now 
being applied in a limited way, and points of single contact have been set up, although 
the Hungarian e-portal does not yet allow for the completion of all administrative 
procedures. In the context of the Magyary Programme, the total number of public 
administrative bodies has been reduced from 649 in 2010 to 318 mainly through 
integration many responsibilities were transferred from the local government level to the 
state, and one-stop shops for citizens were created at the county level. It is important to 
guarantee an adequate local regional partnership in the implementation of development 
programmes, mainly regional operational programmes within the Cohesion Policy.  
As far as tax measures are concerned, a number of new taxes have been introduced 
whose administrative impact is likely to be high compared to the revenues generated (e.g. 
on unhealthy packaged food and on pornographic content). The complexity of tax rules 
on the whole affects firms of various sizes differently: the government estimates that 
larger firms devote on average 1% of their turnover to the administration of taxes, while 
the same figure is near 10% for small enterprises.25 The compensation mechanism to 
alleviate the increased PIT burden on low earners further risks offsetting the potential 
administrative simplification gain associated with the introduction of the flat PIT rate. 
Importantly, rapid lawmaking in itself also exacerbates the administrative burden. An 
aspect of this is the extensive practice of individual MPs submitting bills, thereby 
circumventing the requirement of impact assessment. 
In general, apart from the tax area, the envisaged measures are relevant and go in the 
right direction, but implementation is lagging. The very comprehensive public 
consultation procedure prior to adopting the programme reflects good practice. Progress 
towards meeting the 2011 recommendation on business administration, therefore, 
has been partial, and the size of the challenge together with the high ambition of the 
plans point towards a need for further close monitoring of the implementation in view of 
the envisaged impact.  
The 2012 Annual Growth Survey notes the importance of improving the transparency 
and quality of public administration and the judiciary. This is relevant for Hungary 
who ranks 64th on judicial independence on the Global Competitiveness Index, with the 
Commission having referred Hungary to the European Court of Justice regarding the 
retirement age of judges on 25 April 2012 and administrative letters sent about the 
independence of the judiciary in January and March. In terms of other performance 
indicators, the length of proceedings and case backlog do not appear to present major 
problems within the Hungarian judicial system.26 Regarding public administration, 
Hungary ranks 81st in the transparency of government policymaking, 109th in the 
diversion of public funds, and 130th concerning public trust in politicians. The German-
Hungarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce also reported in April 2012 that 87% of 
its respondents are unsatisfied with the unpredictable economic environment (the worst 
result compared to previous years) and 62% rate the erosion of trust in legal security 
stemming from non-transparent legislation as the key factors behind declining investor 
                                                 
24  According to the Government Decree (1133/2011) on the first steps of administrative burden 
reduction adopted in May 2011 a first evaluation should have been prepared six months after the 
adoption of the Decree. 
25  See also Reszkető Petra (2012) Vállalkozni kicsiben és nagyban –Magyarország (Budapest 
Institute). 
26  CEPEJ (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice), 2010 Report,:  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_EN.asp?. 
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sentiment. This is also a concern since increasing FDI could be an important channel for 
reducing the currently very high net international investment position.  
The scope to improve is therefore considerable, and recent developments have been in 
the wrong direction. The weakest pillars of the National Integrity System, as presented 
by Transparency International,27 remain similar to the situation under previous 
governments (e.g. political parties, the business sector). However, the two-thirds majority 
won by the government in 2010 has significantly relaxed the external constraints on 
appointments and the reorganisation of institutions and rules. This has facilitated, for 
instance, limiting the remit of the Constitutional Court, and rewriting the Basic Law 
without genuinely broad consultation, which provoked strong criticism inter alia by the 
Venice Commission and the EU. Party financing has also been a long-standing concern: 
the State Audit Office only examines invoices submitted by the political parties rather 
than assessing real expenditure. The lack of control has the potential to seriously 
undermine anti-corruption efforts.  
Finally, there is room to reinforce internal compliance mechanisms as regards state aid. 
The number of prohibition decisions taken by the Commission in the 2004-2011 period 
was the 8th highest in Hungary in the EU (with the number of positive decisions taken 
into account for those Member States who would otherwise tie in the rankings). The size 
of sectoral (as opposed to horizontal) aid as a percentage of GDP, which can be an 
unfavourable indicator of the quality of aid, was the highest in Hungary among the 
Member States in 2010, although much of this reflects aid volumes granted prior to 
accession, and set to end according to country-specific treaty provisions. On the positive 
side, Hungary demonstrated the fourth highest level of compliance with the State Aid 
Best Practices code. 
                                                 
27  Transparency International (2012) Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011. 
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 4. OVERVIEW TABLE  
2011 commitments Summary assessment 
Country-specific recommendations (CSRs) 
CSR 1: Strengthen the fiscal effort in order to 
comply with the Council recommendation to correct 
the excessive deficit in a sustainable manner, inter 
alia by avoiding the structural deterioration in 2011 
implicit in the planned 2 % of GDP budget surplus 
and ensure that the budget deficit is kept safely below 
the 3% of GDP threshold in 2012 and beyond, 
contributing to the reduction of the high public debt 
ratio. Fully implement the announced fiscal measures 
and adopt additional measures of a permanent nature 
if needed at the latest in the 2012 budget to secure the 
budgetary target for that year. The 2012 budget 
should also identify the additional measures in order 
to attain the 2013 target in the convergence 
programme. Ensure progress towards the medium-
term objective (MTO) by at least 0.5 % of GDP 
annually until the MTO is reached and use possible 
windfall revenues to accelerate the fiscal 
consolidation.   
 
The government has achieved considerable 
progress regarding the implementation of the 
consolidation and structural reform measures 
included in the 2011 convergence programme 
and further saving measures adopted as part of 
the 2012 budget. Moreover, a new package of 
consolidation steps, concentrating mainly on 
the revenue side, was announced in the 2012 
convergence programme with the ambition to 
attain the deficit targets in 2012 and 2013. 
Whereas no effort was made to avoid the 
structural deterioration in 2011the fiscal 
adjustment is assessed to be sufficient to attain 
the official 2012 deficit target thanks to a 
structural improvement of over 2% of GDP. 
For 2013, the 2012 Spring Forecast projects a 
deficit of 2.9% of GDP, which could even be 
somewhat better based on most recent 
information. At the same time this deficit 
forecast assumes that all extraordinary 
reserves are eliminated i.e. no buffer remains 
to offset any unforeseen adverse 
developments. This forecast is still above the 
official target of 2.2% of GDP as a number of 
announced measures are not yet sufficiently 
substantiated, e.g. some expenditure cuts 
related to the budgetary chapters. 
CSR 2: Adopt and implement regulations specifying 
the operational aspects of the new constitutional 
fiscal governance framework, including, inter alia, 
the numerical rules that will be implemented at the 
central and local level until the debt ratio has 
declined to below 50 % of GDP. Regarding the fiscal 
framework, implement and strengthen multiannual 
fiscal planning, improve the transparency of public 
finances and broaden the remit of the Fiscal Council. 
 
New regulations have been adopted related to 
the operationalisation aspects of the new 
constitutional fiscal governance framework 
but some weaknesses pertaining to its design 
features can be identified. The medium-term 
budgetary planning is still indicative in the 
new framework. The analytical remit and the 
necessary resources of the Fiscal Council are 
not commensurate to its newly granted strong 
veto power. Finally, the availability of 
budgetary information is still not sufficient. 
CSR 3: Enhance participation in the labour market 
by alleviating the impact of the tax reform on low 
earners in a budget-neutral manner. Strengthen 
measures to encourage women's participation in the 
labour market by expanding childcare and pre-school 
facilities. 
The policy responses have only been partially 
relevant to the extent that the instruments 
chosen to address the impact of the tax reform 
on low earners have been suboptimal, while 
the measures to strengthen women's 
participation in the labour market are too 
limited, thus constitute a very small step in the 
right direction. The policy instruments cannot 
be considered ambitious since their scope is 
rather limited in comparison to the challenge.  
CSR 4: Take steps to strengthen the capacity of the 
Public Employment Service and other providers to 
increase the quality and effectiveness of training, job 
search assistance and individualised services. 
There has been no progress towards meeting 
the recommendation regarding the Public 
Employment Service. Some of the measures 
aiming to provide tailor-made services for 
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Reinforce active labour market measures delivering 
positive evidence-based results. In consultation with 
stakeholders, introduce tailor-made programmes, for 
the low-skilled and other particularly disadvantaged 
groups. 
disadvantaged groups are relevant (the ESF 
programmes), others are ambitious insofar as 
the activation of some disadvantaged groups is 
concerned, but unlikely to be effective in 
improving the placement of participants in the 
open job market (public works). In the 
absence of a comprehensive evaluation of 
ALMP provision, there has not been much 
progress in linking funding to results. 
CSR 5: Improve the business environment by 
implementing all the measures envisaged for 
regulatory reform and lowering administrative 
burdens in the national reform programme; assess the 
effectiveness of current SME support policies and 
adjust public programmes in order to improve access 
to non-bank funding. 
In general, apart from the tax area, the 
envisaged measures are relevant and go in the 
right direction. The very comprehensive 
public consultation procedure prior adopting 
the program also reflects good practice. 
Progress towards meeting this part of the fifth 
2011 CSR, therefore, has been encouraging 
although not uniformly so, but the size of the 
challenge and the high ambition of the plans 
point towards a need for further close 
monitoring of the implementation in view of 
the envisaged impact. Efforts to improve 
access to non-bank funding have been 
relevant, but they lack in ambition compared 
to the current scope of the problem, in the 
context of contracting credit to the corporate 
sector. 
Europe 2020 (national targets and progress) 
Employment rate target (in %): 75% Employment rate (%): 60.5% (2009), 60.4% 
(2010), 60.7% (2011). 
The 2011 Convergence Programme calculated 
with the creation of 400,000 new jobs for 
2011-2015. As can be seen from the latest data 
for 2011, there has only been a slight increase. 
The effect of the public works programme is 
already reflected in the 2011 employment data 
and will be responsible for most of the 
expected employment growth in 2012-2013. 
However, it would be desirable to focus on 
policies that facilitate reaching the 
employment rate by organic job creation in the 
market. Reasonable progress has been made 
towards the achievement of this objective. 
R&D target (in %): 1.8% Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (in % of 
GDP): 1.17%% (in 2009), 1.16% (2010 
provisional figure).Hungary has recently 
changed the regulation of the private sector`s 
innovation obligations and access to funds. 
The compulsory innovation contribution (a 
percentage of their net revenues that 
enterprises pay to the so called Research, 
Technology and Innovation Fund) was 
abolished and the tender system for using the 
funds from this innovation contribution fund 
is under renewal. Parallel to this, the state 
contribution to the innovation fund will be 
decreased by 0.1% of GDP in 2013 according 
to the new NRP. The effectiveness of these 
schemes is currently under review. Some 
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progress has been made towards achieving 
this objective, the results are inconclusive. 
CO2 emission reduction target (development in %) of 
the Member State: -10% 
Greenhouse gas emissions, base year 
1990.Index 1990 = 100: 69 (in 2009) After 
1990 a strong increase appeared in the CO2 
emission that was due to increased public 
transport activity. Since 2003, CO2 emissions 
in Hungary follow a declining path although 
this decrease is slow. Some progress has been 
made towards achieving the objective 
Renewable energy target: 14.65% in overall final 
energy consumption 
Share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption: 7.3% (2009). Over the 
last decade, the share of renewable energy in 
all energy usage doubled in Hungary (it was 
3.3 in 1999). However, it still does not reach 
the average of the Member States. Some 
progress has been made towards achieving 
this objective, but there is a great deal of room 
left for progress. 
Energy efficiency: Reduction in primary energy 
consumption by 2020 (in Mtoe) 
2.96Mtoe 
Gross inland consumption of energy divided 
by GDP (kilogramme of oil equivalent per 1 
000 euros): 414.2 (2009), 419.5 (2010)The 
energy efficiency objectives are set according 
to national circumstances and national 
formulations. As the methodology to express 
the 2020 energy consumption impact of these 
objectives in the same format was agreed only 
recently, the Commission is not yet able to 
present this overview. 
Early school leaving target (in %): 10% Early leavers from education and training 
(percentage of the population aged 18-24 with 
at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training): 11.2% in 2009 
and 10.5% in 2010. 
After the modest decrease from 2009 to 2010 
(2011 data is not available yet) the mandatory 
school age will be changed. From the next 
academic year, the upper age limit for 
compulsory schooling will be decreased from 
18 years to 16, allowing students to leave 
school earlier. This is not aligned with the 
stage at which secondary school qualifications 
are received and it may increase the rate of 
early school leaving. 
Tertiary education target (in %): 30.3% Tertiary educational attainment (% of 
population 30-34 having successfully 
completed tertiary education): 25.1% in 2009 
and 26% in 2010. 
Hungary has made considerable progress in 
this area since 2006: each year on average 
over percentage point growth was achieved, 
but the Hungarian figure is still below the EU 
average. In the academic year starting in 
September 2012, the implementation of the 
new higher education bill will start. It is 
already noticeable that partly because of the 
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significant cut in the number of fully state-
funded places the number of registrations 
suffered a major setback by 30 000. At the 
same time, the full implementation is a longer 
process, so it is too early to evaluate.  
Progress has been made towards achieving 
this objective, albeit recent changes could 
slow down the improvement. 
Target for the reduction of the population at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion: 450,000 
The number of Hungarian citizens at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion was 2,924,000 in 
2009 and 2,948,000 in 2010. 
Despite the common endeavour and probably 
as the result of the crisis, poverty has not 
declined, it even grew. No progress has been 
made towards achieving this objective.   
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 5. ANNEX  






2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Core indicators
GDP growth rate 2.4 4.2 2.2 -6.8 1.3 1.7 -0.3 1.0
Output gap 1 -2.1 0.5 3.1 -5.1 -3.9 -2.3 -2.7 -2.0
HICP (annual % change) 16.5 7.1 5.4 4.0 4.7 3.9 5.5 3.9
Domestic demand (annual % change) 2 1.9 4.5 0.6 -10.5 -0.5 -0.5 -2.0 -0.3
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 3 8.7 6.0 7.5 10.0 11.2 10.9 10.6 9.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.3 23.3 22.0 20.7 18.0 16.7 16.2 15.8
Gross national saving (% of GDP) 20.0 17.7 16.2 17.8 19.4 20.0 20.7 21.7
General government (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -6.5 -6.0 -6.5 -4.6 -4.2 4.3 -2.5 -2.9
Gross debt 68.5 56.6 66.9 79.8 81.4 80.6 78.5 78.0
Net financial assets -28.4 -36.4 -50.8 -59.6 -61.0 n.a n.a n.a
Total revenue 45.2 43.2 44.0 46.9 45.2 52.9 46.1 44.6
Total expenditure 51.7 49.2 50.5 51.5 49.4 48.6 48.6 47.6
  of which: Interest 8.3 4.5 4.1 4.7 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2
Corporations (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -4.1 -2.3 -1.6 4.3 6.1 n.a n.a n.a
Net financial assets, non-financial corporations -104.2 -104.7 -109.8 -128.4 -121.4 n.a n.a n.a
Net financial assets, financial corporations -0.9 -2.3 -4.9 2.7 5.2 n.a n.a n.a
Gross capital formation 16.8 15.4 14.8 9.6 11.0 n.a n.a n.a
Gross operating surplus 16.8 20.1 22.5 21.9 24.8 n.a n.a n.a
Households and NPISH (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) 5.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.0 n.a n.a n.a
Net financial assets 58.7 62.3 62.0 66.4 66.9 n.a n.a n.a
Gross wages and salaries 33.5 35.5 36.7 37.0 35.9 n.a n.a n.a
Net property income 5.7 4.2 3.4 3.6 2.9 n.a n.a n.a
Current transfers received 16.9 17.5 19.3 20.1 19.3 n.a n.a n.a
Gross saving 10.8 6.4 6.0 6.0 4.7 n.a n.a n.a
Rest of the world (%  of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -4.8 -7.4 -6.7 1.0 2.8 2.9 5.4 7.0
Net financial assets 75.0 81.9 103.7 120.2 111.3 n.a n.a n.a
Net exports of goods and services -0.3 -2.8 -0.4 4.9 6.5 7.4 9.0 10.5
Net primary income from the rest of the world -4.7 -5.0 -6.0 -4.4 -4.9 -6.2 -6.6 -6.6
Net capital transactions 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.0 3.2 3.3
Tradable sector 47.7 45.8 45.7 43.5 45.0 47.6 n.a n.a
Non-tradable sector 37.8 40.0 40.1 41.0 39.6 37.2 n.a n.a
  of which: Building and construction sector 4.2 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.3 n.a n.a
Real effective exchange rate (index, 2000=100) 96.2 120.1 140.6 132.2 127.9 130.9 125.7 128.2
Terms of trade in goods and services (index, 2000=100) 101.6 101.1 98.8 98.8 98.8 97.4 97.2 97.7
Market performance of exports (index, 2000=100) 83.1 108.3 134.7 149.3 153.5 157.8 163.2 168.3
Commission spring 2012 forecast
Notes:
1 The output gap constitutes the gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices.
2 The indicator for domestic demand includes stocks.
3  Unemployed persons are all persons who were not employed, had actively sought work and were ready to begin working immediately or within two 





Table II. Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts 
2014 2015
COM CP COM CP COM CP CP CP
Real GDP (% change) 1.7 1.7 -0.3 0.1 1.0 1.6 2.5 2.5
Private consumption (% change) 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.4 0.0 0.3 2.5 2.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% change) -5.4 -5.4 -2.3 -2.3 -0.7 0.3 3.5 3.5
Exports of goods and services (% change) 8.4 8.4 5.4 4.7 8.0 8.8 10.5 10.5
Imports of goods and services (% change) 6.3 6.3 4.0 2.8 7.4 8.0 10.9 10.9
Contributions to real GDP growth:
- Final domestic demand -1.1 -1.1 -1.8 -1.3 -0.3 0.2 1.9 2.0
- Change in inventories 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
- Net exports 2.2 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.7 0.7
Output gap1 -2.3 -2.4 -2.7 -3.0 -2.0 -2.6 -1.7 -1.2
Employment (% change) 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.2 3.0 3.4
Unemployment rate (%) 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.9 9.6 10.3 9.5 8.9
Labour productivity (% change) 1.4 0.9 -1.3 -1.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8
HICP inflation (%) 3.9 3.9 5.5 5.2 3.9 4.2 3.0 3.0
GDP deflator (% change) 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.2 3.6 2.9 3.0 2.7
Comp. of employees (per head, % change) 5.8 3.2 3.7 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.5 3.3
Net lending/borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world (% of GDP)
2.9 3.6 5.4 6.5 7.0 7.3 7.3 6.4
1In percent of potential GDP, with potential GDP growth according to the programme as recalculated by the Commission.
Source :
Note:




Table III. Composition of the budgetary adjustment 
2011 2014 2015 Change: 
2011-2015
COM COM CP COM CP CP CP CP
Revenue 52.9 46.1 46.0 44.6 45.2 45.3 44.9 -8.0
of which:
- Taxes on production and imports 16.6 17.4 17.5 17.1 17.6 17.4 17.1 0.5
- Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.4 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 0.6
- Social contributions 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.9 -0.1
- Other (residual) 16.9 8.7 8.6 7.9 7.8 8.0 7.9 -9.0
Expenditure 48.6 48.6 48.5 47.6 47.4 47.2 46.4 -2.2
of which:
- Primary expenditure 44.5 44.6 44.4 43.4 43.2 43.1 42.7 -1.8
of which:
Compensation of employees 10.1 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.9 10.2 10.2 0.1
Intermediate consumption 7.5 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.2 -1.3
Social payments 17.9 17.2 17.1 16.8 16.6 16.2 15.9 -2.0
Subsidies 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 -0.1
Gross fixed capital formation 2.9 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 1.3
Other (residual) 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 0.2
- Interest expenditure 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.7 -0.4
General government balance (GGB) 4.3 -2.5 -2.5 -2.9 -2.2 -1.9 -1.5 -5.8
Primary balance 8.3 1.5 1.6 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.2 -6.1
One-off and other temporary measures 9.6 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -9.6
GGB excl. one-offs -5.3 -3.3 -3.3 -2.9 -2.4 -1.9 -1.5 3.8
Output gap2 -2.3 -2.7 -3.0 -2.0 -2.6 -1.7 -1.2 1.1
Cyclically adjusted balance2 5.3 -1.3 -1.1 -2.0 -1.0 -1.1 -0.9 -6.3
Structural balance3 -4.3 -2.1 -1.9 -2.0 -1.2 -1.1 -0.9 3.3
Change in structural balance 2.2 2.3 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.2
Structural primary balance3 -0.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0
Change in structural primary balance 2.2 2.4 0.1 0.9 0.0 -0.2
Expenditure benchmark
Public expenditure growth4 (real) 14.41 -9.47 -0.11 -2.49 1.70 2.17 -
Reference rate5,6 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 -
Lower reference rate5,7 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -
Deviation in % of GDP 
from applicable reference rate
6.61 -3.76 0.20 -0.75 0.44 0.62 -
Two-year average deviation in % of GDP 
from applicable reference rate
n.a. n.a. 3.41 -2.26 -0.16 0.53 -
7The lower reference rate applies as long as the country is adjusting towards its MTO, including the year in which it reaches the MTO.
5The reference rates applicable to 2014 onwards will be available from mid-2012. For illustrative purposes, the current reference rates have 
also been applied to the years 2014 onwards.
2Output gap (in % of potential GDP) and cyclically-adjusted balance according to the programme as recalculated by the Commission on the 
basis of the information in the programme.
3Structural (primary) balance = cyclically adjusted (primary) balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
4Modified expenditure aggregate used for the expenditure benchmark, growth rates net of non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit 
and of discretionary measures.
Source :
Convergence programme (CP); Commission spring 2012 forecasts (COM); Commission  calculations.
Notes:
1On a no-policy-change basis.






Table IV. Debt dynamics 
 
2014 2015
COM CP COM CP CP CP
Gross debt ratio1 73.4 80.6 78.5 78.4 78.0 77.0 73.7 72.7
Change in the ratio 3.9 -0.8 -2.1 -2.2 -0.4 -1.4 -3.3 -1.0
Contributions 2 :
1. Primary balance 1.2 -8.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.2 -2.0 -2.2 -2.2
2. Snow-ball effect 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.0
Of which:
Interest expenditure 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.7
Growth effect 0.3 -1.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -1.2 -1.8 -1.7
Inflation effect -2.8 -2.7 -3.5 -3.2 -2.7 -2.1 -2.1 -1.9




Privatisation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Val. & residual effects
2014 2015
COM/SP3 SP4 COM/SP3 SP4 SP SP
Gap to the debt benchmark5,6 - - - - - - - -
Structural adjustment7 - - - - 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.2
To be compared to:
Required adjustment8 - - - - 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
7Applicable only during the transition period of three years from the correction of the excessive deficit for EDP that were ongoing 
in November 2011.
8Defines the remaining annual structural adjustment over the transition period which ensures that - if followed – Member State 










Convergence programme (CP); Commission spring 2012 forecasts (COM); Commission calculations.
2011
2The snowball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth 
and inflation on the debt ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual 
accounting, the accumulation of financial assets and valuation and other residual effects. 
(% of GDP)
6Shows the difference between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the debt benchmark. If positive, projected gross debt-to-GDP ratio does 
not comply with the debt reduction benchmark.
3 Assessment of the consolidation path set in CP assuming growth follows the COM forecasts.
4Assessment of the consolidation path set in the CP assuming growth follows the SP projections.


















S2 0.5 0.0 2.9 0.7
of which:
Initial budgetary position (IBP) -0.5 -1.1 0.7 -1.6
Long-term change in the primary balance (LTC) 1.0 1.1 2.3 2.4
 of which:
pensions 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.2
health care and long term care 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5
others -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3
S1 (required adjustment)* -0.7 -1.8 2.2 -0.1
Debt, % of GDP (2011)
Age-related expenditure, % of GDP (2011)
* The required adjustment of the primary balance until 2020 to reach a public debt of 60% of GDP by 2030.
Source : Commission, 2012 convergence programme.
Note : the 'no policy change' scenario depicts the sustainability gap under the assumption that the budgetary 
position evolves according to the spring 2012 forecast until 2013. The 'convergence programme' scenario depicts 





























































COM no-policy change scenario
COM + Shock ( -1p.p. in the short-term/long-term interest rate on maturing and new debt from 2014)
COM + Shock (+1p.p. in the short-term/long-term interest rate on maturing and new debt from 2014)
COM consolidation scenario (0.5% per year on SB) in order to achieve MTO
COM consolidation scenario (1% per year on SB) in order to achieve MTO
SP scenario
(% of GDP) Gross debt as % of GDP - HU - Medium term debt projections
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Table VI. Taxation 
2001 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total tax revenues  (incl. actual compulsory social contributions, % of GDP) 38.7 37.4 40.4 40.3 40.1 37.7
Breakdown by economic function (% of GDP)1
     Consumption 14.7 14.5 14.7 14.3 15.2 14.8
              of which:
              - VAT 8.1 8.4 8.1 7.8 8.6 8.7
             - excise duties on tobacco and alcohol 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.3
             - energy 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
             - other (residual) 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.7
     Labour employed 18.6 17.9 19.3 19.8 19.0 17.4
     Labour non-employed 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
     Capital and business income 3.7 3.3 4.2 3.8 3.4 2.2
     Stocks of capital/wealth 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.5
     p.m.  Environmental taxes2 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
VAT efficiency3
     Actual VAT revenues as % of theoretical revenues at standard rate 48.2 48.8 58.7 57.1 49.8 52.4
Source: Commission
3 The VAT efficiency is measured via the VAT revenue ratio. The VAT revenue ratio is defined as the ratio between the actual VAT revenue collected and the revenue 
that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at  the standard rate to all final consumption. A low ratio can indicate a reduction of the tax base due to large 
exemptions or the application of reduced rates to a wide range of goods and services ('policy gap') or a failure to collect all tax due to e.g. fraud ('collection gap'). See 
European Commission (2011), Tax reforms in EU Member States, European Economy 5/2011, for a more detailed explanation.
2 This category comprises taxes on energy, transport and pollution and resources included in taxes on consumption and capital.
1 Tax revenues are broken down by economic function, i.e. according to whether taxes are raised on consumption, labour or capital. See European Commission (2012), 





Table VII. Financial market indicators 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total assets of the banking sector (% of GDP) 113.1 121.3 142.7 129.7 115.7
Share of assets of the five largest banks (% of total assets) 54.1 54.4 55.2 54.7 …
Foreign ownership of banking system (% of total assets) 57.9 64.0 54.1 … …
Financial soundness indicators:
              - non-performing loans (% of total loans) 1) 2.3 3.0 6.7 9.8 12.3
              - capital adequacy ratio (%) 1) 2) 10.4 12.4 13.9 13.9 13.5
              - return on equity (%) 1), 3) 18.4 16.7 8.3 0.4 1.3
Bank loans to the private sector (year-on-year % change) 16.0 13.8 -5.0 0.5 -12.3
Lending for house purchase (year-on-year % change) 15.9 18.5 0.0 6.8 -14.0
Loan to deposit ratio 128.4 139.2 132.4 136.7 128.1
CB liquidity as % of liabilities 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0
Banks' exposure to countries receiving official financial assistance  (% of GDP)4) … … … … …
Private debt (% of GDP) … 65.2 71.5 68.4 …
Gross external debt (% of GDP) 4)
            - Public 34.6 38.8 46.4 46.0 51.1
            - Private 56.0 76.9 85.5 70.2 65.6
Long term interest rates spread versus Bund (basis points)* 252.8 425.4 590.1 453.8 502.7
Credit default swap spreads for sovereign securities (5-year)* 53.1 205.8 338.3 288.3 382.4
* Measured in basis points.
Notes: 
Bank for International Settlements and Eurostat (exposure to macro-financially vulnerable countries), IMF (financial soundness indicators), 
Commission (long-term interest rates), World Bank (gross external debt), ECB (all other indicators).
1) Latest September 2011.
Source :
2) The capital adequacy ratio is defined as total capital divided by risk weighted assets.   
3) Net income to equity ratio. 
4) Latest data 2011Q3.
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Table VIII. Labour market and social indicators 
Labour market indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Employment rate 
(% of population aged 20-64)
62.6 62.6 61.9 60.5 60.4 60.7
Employment growth 
(% change from previous year)
0.7 -0.1 -1.2 -2.5 0.0 0.8
Employment rate of women 
(% of female population aged 20-64)
55.7 55.5 55.1 54.4 55.0 54.9
Employment rate of men 
(% of male population aged 20-64)
69.9 70.2 69.0 67.0 66.0 66.8
Employment rate of older workers 
(% of population aged 55-64)
33.6 33.1 31.4 32.8 34.4 35.8
Part-time employment 
(% of total employment)
4.0 4.2 4.7 5.6 5.9 6.8
Part-time employment of women  
(% of women employment)
5.6 5.8 6.2 7.5 8.1 9.3
Part-time employment of men  
(% of men employment)
2.6 2.8 3.3 4.0 3.9 4.8
Fixed term employment 
(% of employees with a fixed term contract)
6.7 7.3 7.9 8.5 9.7 8.9
Unemployment rate1 (% of labour force) 7.5 7.4 7.8 10.0 11.2 10.9
Long-term unemployment2  (% of labour force) 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 5.5 5.2
Youth unemployment rate 
(% of youth labour force aged 15-24)
19.1 18.0 19.9 26.5 26.6 26.1
Youth NEET3 rate (% of population aged 15-24) 12.4 11.3 11.5 13.4 12.4 :
Early leavers from education and training (% of 
pop. 18-24 with at most lower sec. educ. and not 
in further education or training)
12.6 11.4 11.7 11.2 10.5 :
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population 
30-34 having successfully completed tertiary 
education)
20.7 22.0 24.0 25.1 26.0 :
Labour productivity per person employed 
(annual % change )
3.5 0.1 2.4 -4.2 0.9 1.4
Hours worked per person employed  (annual % 
change)
-0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.9 -0.3 0.9
Labour productivity per hour worked (annual % 
change; constant prices)
3.7 0.3 2.2 -3.2 1.3 0.5
Compensation per employee (annual % change; 
constant prices)
2.0 0.9 1.5 -4.8 -5.3 2.2
Nominal unit labour cost growth (annual % 
change)
2.0 6.3 4.3 2.9 -3.2 4.4
Real unit labour cost growth (annual % change) -1.4 0.8 -0.9 -0.6 -6.1 0.8
1 According to ILO definition, age group 15-74)
Notes:
2 Share of persons in the labour force who have been unemployed for at least 12 months.
3 NEET are persons that are neither in employment nor in any education or training.
Sources: 
Commission (EU Labour Force Survey and European National Accounts) 
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Table VIII. Labour market and social indicators (continued) 
Expenditure on social protection 
benefits (% of GDP)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sickness/Health care 6.41 6.35 5.67 5.62 5.68
Invalidity 2.12 2.16 2.15 2.10 2.09
Old age and survivors 7.83 8.00 8.42 8.84 9.10
Family/Children 2.53 2.83 2.85 2.86 3.03
Unemployment 0.62 0.67 0.77 0.83 0.97
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.51 0.54 0.92 0.72 0.63
Total 21.9 22.5 22.7 22.9 23.4
of which:  Means tested benefits 1.14 0.96 1.42 1.22 1.17
Social inclusion indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion1 (% of total 
population)
31.4 29.4 28.2 29.6 29.9
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of 
people aged 0-17)
37.7 34.1 33.4 37.2 38.7
Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of 
people aged 65+)
23.9 21.1 17.5 17.5 16.8
At-risk-of-poverty rate2 (% of total population) 15.9 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3
Value of relative poverty threshold (single 
household per year) - in PPS
3646 3894 3958 4102 4011
Severe material deprivation3  (% of total 
population)
20.9 19.9 17.9 20.3 21.6
Share of people living in low work intensity 
households4 (% of people aged 0-59 not 
student)
13.0 11.3 12.0 11.3 11.8
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons 
employed) 6.8 5.8 5.8 6.2 5.3
Sources: 
For expenditure on social protection benefits ESSPROS; for social inclusion EU-SILC.
Notes:
1 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE): individuals who are at risk of poverty (AROP) 
and/or suffering from severe material deprivation (SMD) and/or living in households with zero or very low 
work intensity (LWI).
2 At-risk-of poverty rate: share of people with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national 
equivalised median income. 
3 Share of people who experience at least 4 out of 9 deprivations: people cannot afford to i) pay their rent or 
utility bills, ii) keep their home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish, or a protein 
equivalent every second day, v) enjoy a week of holiday away from home once a year, vi) have a car, vii) have 
a washing machine, viii) have a colour TV, or ix) have a telephone.
4 People living in households with very low work intensity: share of people aged 0-59 living in households 
where the adults work less than 20% of their total work-time potential during the previous 12 months.
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Table IX. Product market performance and policy indicators 
Performance indicators 2002-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Labour productivity1 total economy (annual 
growth in %)
4.1 1.1 2.1 -4.0 1.0 1.7
Labour productivity1 in manufacturing (annual 
growth in %)
7.6 6.0 -0.4 -6.3 12.1 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in electricity, gas, water 
(annual growth in %)
-1.7 4.5 13.4 -12.0 n.a. n.a.
Labour productivity1 in the construction sector 
(annual growth in %)
-0.1 -9.1 -4.2 -4.8 -4.7 n.a.
Patent intensity in manufacturing2 (patents of the 
EPO divided by gross value added of the sector)
0.9 0.9 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Policy indicators 2002-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Enforcing contracts3 (days) n.a. 335 335 395 395 395
Time to start a business3 (days) n.a. 16 5 4 4 4
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 n.a.
Tertiary educational attainment 
(% of 30-34 years old population)
17.2 20.1 22.4 23.9 25.7 n.a.
Total public expenditure on education 
(% of GDP) 5.5 5.2 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Product market regulation4, Overall
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
n.a. n.a. 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Product market regulation4, Retail
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
n.a. n.a. 2.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Product market regulation4, Network Industries5
(Index; 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated)
2.8 2.6 1.8* n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 Patent data refer to applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). They are counted according to the year in which 
they were filed at the EPO. They are broken down according to the inventor's place of residence, using fractional counting if 
multiple inventors or IPC classes are provided to avoid double counting. 
3 The methodologies, including the assumptions, for this indicator are presented in detail on the website 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology. 
4 The methodologies for the product market regulation indicators are presented in detail on the website 
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_34323_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html. The latest available product market 
regulation indicators refer to 2003 and 2008, except for Network Industries.
Source :
Commission, World Bank - Doing Business  (for enforcing contracts and time to start a business) and OECD (for the 




1Labour productivity is defined as gross value added (in constant prices) divided by the number of persons employed.
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Table X. Indicators on green growth 
2001-
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Energy intensity kgoe / € 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42
Carbon intensity kg / € 1.39 1.21 1.18 1.13 1.11 n.a.
Resource intensity (reciprocal of resource productivity) kg / € 2.60 2.36 1.84 2.05 1.80 n.a.
Waste intensity kg / € n.a. 0.35 0.33 0.31 n.a. n.a.
Energy balance of trade % GDP -2.8% -6.3% -4.6% -6.2% -4.8% -5.0%
Energy weight in HICP % 13 13 13 14 14 15
Difference between change energy price and inflation % n.a. 3.3 15.4 7.5 3.1 1.6
Environmental taxes over labour taxes ratio 14.7% 15.4% 14.0% 13.0% 13.3% n.a.
Environmental taxes over total taxes ratio 7.2% 7.6% 7.0% 6.7% 6.6% n.a.
Industry energy intensity kgoe / € 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 n.a.
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy % GDP 10.7 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.2 n.a.
Electricity prices for medium-sized industrial users € / kWh 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.10
Public R&D for energy % GDP n.a. 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% n.a.
Public R&D for the environment % GDP n.a. 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% n.a.
Recycling rate of municipal waste ratio 11.6% 18.7% 20.4% 23.8% 24.9% n.a.
Share of GHG emissions covered by ETS % n.a. 33.2% 35.6% 37.3% 33.6% n.a.
Transport energy intensity kgoe / € 0.75 0.77 0.66 0.68 0.77 n.a.
Transport carbon intensity kg / € 2.03 2.13 1.82 1.82 2.05 n.a.
Change in the ratio of passenger transport and GDP % -4.4% -3.6% -10.5% 0.3% n.a. n.a.
Energy import dependency % 59.3% 62.7% 61.3% 63.4% 58.8% n.a.
Diversification of oil import sources HHI n.a. 0.96 0.95 1.00 1.00 n.a.
Diversification of energy mix HHI 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.25 n.a.
Share of renewable energy in energy mix % 3.6% 4.5% 5.1% 5.9% 7.3% n.a.
Diversification of the energy mix: Herfindahl Index over natural gas, total petrol products, nuclear heat, renewable energies and solid fuels
Environmental taxes over labour or total taxes: from DG TAXUD's database "Taxation trends in the European Union"
Industry energy intensity: final energy consumption of industry (in kgoe) divided by gross value added of industry (in EUR) 
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy: share of gross value added of the energy-intensive industries in GDP
Recycling rate of municipal waste: ratio of municipal waste recycled over total municipal waste
Share of renewable energy in energy mix: percentage-share in  gross inland energy consumption, expressed in tonne oil equivalents
Transport energy intensity: final energy consumption of transport (in kgoe) divided by gross value added of industry (in EUR) 
Transport carbon intensity:  greenhouse gas emissions in transport divided by gross value added of the transport sector
Passenger transport growth : measured in %-change in passenger kilometres
Energy import dependency: net energy imports divided by gross inland energy consumption incl. of international bunkers
Diversification of oil import sources: Herfindahl index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of countries of origin 
General explanation of the table items:
Source: Eurostat unless indicated otherwise; ECFIN explanations given below
Public R&D for energy or for the environment: government spending on R&D (GBAORD) for these categories as % of GDP
Share of GHG emissions covered by ETS: based on greenhouse gas emissions as reported by Member States to EEA (excl LULUCF)
          Carbon intensity: Greenhouse gas emissions (in kg CO2 equivalents) divided by GDP (in EUR)
          Resource intensity: Domestic Material Consumption (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)
          Waste intensity: waste (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)
Energy balance of trade: the balance of energy exports and imports, expressed as % of GDP  
Energy weight in HICP: the share of the "energy" items in the consumption basket used in the construction of the HICP
Difference between energy price change and inflation: energy component of HICP, and total HICP inflation (annual %-change)
All macro intensity indicators are expressed as a ratio of a physical quantity to GDP (in 2000 prices)





Security of energy supply
Country-specific notes: 
The year 2011 is not included in the table due to lack of data.
 
